Abstract:
This paper contributes to locating the Malawian dynamics into an emerging discourse
that argues that current microcredit programs are ineffective because they have become
an instrument for serving international and domestic actors’ interests. it aims to analyze
key actors’ interests in public microcredit programs in Malawi. using a qualitative
research design, we draw on 16 key informants, representing 13 national actor
institutions that hold stakes in the design and implementation of these programs.
thematic analysis of data reveals that politicians are mostly interested in the political
patronage function of these microcredit programs. Further, we find that private
microcredit players agitate for the disengagement of government in microcredit
provision solely to protect their economic interests, while bureaucrats fail to push for
technical reforms because they are interested in protecting their jobs by aligning with
politicians’ interests. Further, the findings do not support any evidence of donor
influence on the configuration of current microcredit programs. Based on these findings,
we conclude that the ineffective status quo remains the default mode because it serves
the interests of most actors, except private microfinance players. this analysis is critical
in shaping the nature and direction of the much-needed reforms as it pinpoints specific
key actor institutions that are likely to derail such reforms. the paper recommends an
honest political will-driven stakeholder dialogue towards depoliticizing public microcredit programs
